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Introduction  
From the extensive literature on international conflicts in International Relations (IR), little has been 
explored about the individuals behind the decisions made. In early political science literature, the role of 
the leader was a ‘black box’ that sums up inputs and produces outputs (Post & George, 2004, p. 12). 
When the importance of leadership was finally recognized in the shaping of events, the leader was 
characterized as a rational decision maker but with no attention to his or her personality (Post & 
George, 2004, p. 14). Although decisions are made by individuals, they represent the state as a whole 
and are, therefore, usually referred to using the name of the state or the state’s capital when talking 
about decisions made there (Post & George, 2004, p. 15). Furthermore, when studying international 
conflicts, it is crucial to look at political leaders because of contraction of authority during a crisis – when 
power becomes concentrated in the hands of leaders and their closest advisers with little influence from 
bureaucracy or the public. This decreases the usual democratic restraints and moreover, with only 
limited time in a crisis, leaders are encouraged to decide quickly and act on their interpretation of the 
national interest (Hermann, 2001; Hermann, et al., 2001; Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Hermann & Kegley, 
1995). Therefore, leaders’ interpretation of the problem dominate the state’s reactions as authority 
tends to focus on those persons that carry ultimate responsibility for maintaining government in power 
(Hermann, 2001; Hermann, et al., 2001; Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Hermann & Kegley, 1995).  
The lack of focus on studying individual leaders can be seen in analyses of the intervention in Libya in 
2011. Previous analyses of the crisis focused on the role of NATO, humanitarian interventions, IR 
theories, and bureaucratic politics in the American government (e.g. Kazianis, 2011; Fermor, 2012; 
Bellamy, 2012; Marsh, 2014; Blohmdahl, 2016). None focused on the role of the individual leaders 
involved. At the time, the British Prime Minister David Cameron and the French President Nicholas 
Sarkozy were the first to demand an intervention in Libya. Without their insistence, it seems unlikely 
that the United States (US) would have acted (Fermor, 2012, p. 332). Moreover, the Franco-British 
alliance would have been insufficient to carry out the intervention, as well as initiate the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1973 that would have allowed the intervention (Fermor, 2012, p. 333). Many 
analysts around the Obama administration assumed that the US would not intervene and the tendency 
of staff within the Pentagon and the White House at the beginning of the crisis was to refrain from 
military involvement (Fermor, 2012, p. 333). It is interesting that despite this, Obama agreed to lead the 
intervention. I believe this gap can be explained by looking at Obama’s role in the Decision-Making 
Process (DMP). 
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Theories of political psychology can help to study leaders as they look at the individual level of analysis 
and not only at the system or state level as the prominent IR theories, realism and liberalism do. 
Whereas the former focuses on the balance of power in the anarchic international system and how 
states as unitary actors always try to maximize their power, the latter has a more positive worldview in 
which cooperation is possible and institutions matter. Both theories omit the role of individual leaders. 
However, neoclassical realism differs from its theoretical forerunner. In this theory, attention is paid to 
domestic elements such as decision-making factors and how decisions are made by leaders (Kaarbo, 
2015, p. 204). It is nevertheless still part of the realist school and there is more preference for looking at 
the international system rather than domestic factors. In contrast, much of the literature on leadership 
studies using political psychology begins with the assumption that leaders’ personalities, which include 
their beliefs, values and attitudes, have an effect on their behaviour and type of leadership and 
ultimately, political outcomes (McDermott, 2004, p. 219). Their personality is also determinant in how 
they deal with emotions and stress, which are important in a crisis situation (Winter, 2003). Foreign 
Policy Analysis research also shows that some leaders are able to ignore or manipulate domestic and 
international constraints, and their response to these pressures are even founded in their personal 
characteristics (Kaarbo, 2015, p. 204). Therefore, it is important to use theories of leaders’ personalities 
in this research.  
Based on the literature of political leaders, Hermann (2014) writes about five important factors 
regarding leaders. First, leaders use their beliefs to interpret political context and frame what is right 
and wrong1 – directly impacting which policies they choose. Second, the kind of leadership style they 
apply determine how they work,2 the importance of determining leadership style will be discussed 
further below. Third, motives largely influence what leaders will do3. Fourth, their reaction to and how 
they handle stress is also important4. Lastly, background factors such as first successful political roles 
                                                          
1
 Renshon and Renshon (2008) have written about a leader’s belief system through which the leader filter 
incoming information – this is how the leaders come to understand the world and make their decision (p. 512). 
2
 Kaarbo and Hermann (1998) also argue that leadership style affects how much a leader is involved in the 
decision-making process, the type of focus (s)he has and the strategy chosen to manage the process (pp. 245-246).  
3
 Motives, just as leader’s beliefs and style affect the leader’s understanding of the world and the strategies they 
choose (Hermann, 1980). According to Winter (2005) motives are “the different classes of goals toward which 
people direct their behaviour” (p. 22). Winter has been dominant in the literature focused on individual’s motives 
(e.g. Winter, 2003; Winter, 2005; Winter 2011).  
4
 This becomes clear in another one of her articles, in which Hermann (1979) notes the importance of studying 
leaders during crisis situations as the quality of the leader’s performance varies significantly then. Some 
policymakers tend to get creative in their problem-solving and show more of their ability than usual, while others 
are negatively influenced by it, resulting in unstable behaviour (Hermann, 1979, p. 27). Renshon and Renshon 
(2008) argue that leaders in political decision-making deal with conditions such as threat to important values, 
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and their nature matter too5 (Hermann, 2014, pp. 5-10). The first two factors are of importance in 
providing information as to how leaders will urge their government to act (Hermann, 1980, p. 10). 
Moreover, Hermann et al. have put together eight leadership styles by looking at how leaders act to 
constraints, process information and their motivation to act (2001, pp. 95-96). These factors are 
necessary to assess whether or not the leader is sensitive to the political context. Obtaining this 
knowledge will help determine how much influence leaders will have in forming foreign policy and how 
they will form it. For example, if the leader is less sensitive to the political context, they will be more 
dependent on their own beliefs, attitudes, passions and principles, creating foreign policy based on their 
priorities (Hermann et al. 2001, p. 89). This led to the following research question: 
 “Did Obama’s personal characteristics, and in turn his leadership style, influence the decision-making 
process to intervene in Libya or do IR theories have more explanatory power in this intervention?” 
Theoretical framework 
Leadership Trait Analysis and Leadership Style  
By identifying a leader’s personal characteristics and their reaction to constraints, ability to process 
information and motivation to act, it is possible to determine their leadership style (Hermann, 2005, p. 
179). Leadership style is defined as “the ways in which leaders relate to those around them – whether 
constituents, advisers, or other leaders – and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and 
principles they use to guide such interactions” (Hermann, 2005, p. 181). To determine leadership styles, 
Hermann focuses on seven personality traits in her Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) framework: “the 
belief that one can influence or control what happens, the need for power and influence, conceptual 
complexity, self-confidence, the tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something 
versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others’ ideas and sensitivities, general distrust or 
suspiciousness of others and intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias” (Hermann, 2005, p. 
184). Following Hermann’s LTA framework, personality is here conceptualized as the combination of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
sleeplessness, anxiety, or severe time pressure – which all bring about stress – on a daily basis and, may worsen in 
a crisis situation contributing to poor decision-making (pp. 512-513). Factors that are also taken into account are 
time pressure and how external stress can decrease flexibility, resulting in overreliance on standard operating 
procedures or solutions decision makers learned in other situations and the centralization of authority in the 
decision-making process (Renshon & Renshon, 2008, p. 515). 
5
 Based on Barber’s (1977) argument on how the leader’s first political role, how (s)he obtained that role and how 
it made them feel emotionally (pp. 3-14), influences his or her behaviour. Moreover, Post and Walker (2005) assess 
that besides the individual’s core personality, formative experiences in a person’s life also matter and they help 
shape his or her personality (p. 271).  
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these seven traits.  
The trait belief in one’s own ability to control events is defined as the “view of the world in which leaders 
perceive some degree of control over the situations in which they find themselves” (Hermann, 2005, pp. 
188-189). Leaders who score high in this trait will try to control everything in policy making and its 
implementation, and because of their certainty of the impact they can have in the situation, they are 
less likely to make compromises. Those who score low usually do not take charge, wait to see how the 
situation evolves before taking any action, and have no problem delegating tasks or blaming others 
(Hermann, 2005, pp. 189-190). The need for power is “the desire to control, influence, or have an impact 
on other persons or groups” (Hermann, 2005, p. 190).  If a leader scores high in this trait, they will try 
and manipulate their surroundings to have control over other people, bargain and negotiate to test their 
boundaries and see how far they can come when they keep pushing toward their goals (Hermann, 2005, 
pp. 191-192). Leaders with a low score in need for power, on the other hand, focus on empowering 
others around them, are willing to sacrifice and stimulate high morale in their followers – in the process 
creating a bond between them and making the leader the representative of the group (Hermann, 2005, 
pp. 191-192). If the leader scores high on both traits, they will be focused on getting what they want and 
will be in charge, however, if the leader scores low, they will adjust themselves to the situation and work 
within the boundaries. If the leader is moderate on both traits, the actions they will take depend on 
their other characteristics (Hermann, 2005, p. 187). However, if the score of belief in one’s own ability to 
control events is high and the score of the need for power low, the leader will still take charge of the 
situation but will not be very successful in manipulating people and situations as they are not very 
discreet. If it is the other way around, these leaders are more comfortable with pulling the strings from 
behind the scenes to avoid being accountable for the outcome (Hermann, 2005, pp. 187-188). 
Self-confidence is “an individual’s image of his or her ability to cope adequately with objects and persons 
in the environment” (Hermann, 2005, p. 194) and a trait used as a standard for judging one’s own 
position in a certain context. Leaders with a high score in this trait are more closed to incoming 
information from their surroundings and they are less likely to adapt to a situation because of their 
satisfaction with who they are. Leaders with low self-confidence are not so sure with whom they are and 
are, therefore, easily influenced by the situation and others – this makes them appear inconsistent in 
their actions (Hermann, 2005, p. 195). Conceptual complexity indicates whether individuals are able to 
differentiate situations. Whether they view the world only in black and white, categorizes situations as 
good or bad, or whether they are able to put everything into perspective and see that things can be 
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ambiguous (Hermann, 2005, pp. 195-196). Leaders scoring high on this trait are flexible, do not tend to 
categorize the world in simple groups, ideas are not black and white and they always want more 
information from different views to understand certain situations instead of interpreting them solely 
from their own point of view (Hermann, 2005, p. 196). The ones with a low score in conceptual 
complexity are ready to jump into actions instead of taking their time to assess the situation because 
their view of the world is simply ordered and structured into specific categories. Hence, it is easier for 
them to make a decision (Hermann, 2005, pp. 196-197). This trait interrelates with self-confidence in a 
way that when the former score is higher than the latter, the leaders are generally more sensitive to 
context, interests and input from others and they look at one situation at a time (Hermann, 2005, p. 
192). However, if it is the other way around, the leaders are usually ideologues and goal-driven, so they 
are closed to their surroundings and are willing to do anything to make sure that their plans get carried 
out (Hermann, 2005, p. 192). If both scores are high, the leaders will be strategic and manage to 
combine the two traits in a way that enables them to be sure of what they want to achieve and to adjust 
their surroundings to make it work (Hermann, 2005, p. 193). However, if both scores are low, the 
leaders are closed and choose a position that will have at least limited success, they can be manipulated 
into certain situations for a bit of influence and authority (Hermann, 2005, p. 193). 
Leaders can be driven by different reasons in their motivation to assume office (Hermann, 2005, p. 197). 
This can be a certain cause or ideology, or about obtaining power and support from those around them. 
Leaders also seem to have a need to protect their own kind. Their motivation for assuming office is 
measured by the trait task-focus, which assesses whether they are motivated by problems or 
relationships. Motivation towards the world is measured by the scores of in-group bias and distrust of 
others, which determine how high their need is to preserve and secure the group they are leading 
(Hermann, 2005, p. 197). High scores on task-focus mean that the leader focuses on getting the job 
done instead of concentrating on his or her relationship with important constituencies. A leader who 
manages to balance both, falls under the group of charismatic leaders (Hermann, 2005, p. 198). The 
task-focused leader will do anything to solve a problem – even use their relationships. On the other end 
of the spectrum, the leader will adjust their behaviour to fit the spirit of the group. They try to keep 
spirits high as well as make the group feel empowered, heard and included in decision-making 
(Hermann, 2005, p. 199). Furthermore, in-group bias is “a view of the world in which one’s own group 
(social, political, ethnic, etc.) holds centre stage” (Hermann, 2005, p. 201). A high score indicates that 
the leader has a very ‘us-against-them’ mentality because of their zero-sum worldview; they will always 
make decisions based on what is important for the group and tend to only see the good features 
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(Hermann, 2005, pp. 201-202). If the leader scores low in this trait, they will still favour their own group 
and sees the world as ‘us or them’. In this case, the context remains important which means they do not 
see the world in strictly black or white, and when dealing with discontent in the domestic area, the 
leader will be more inclined to use positive diplomatic gestures instead of scapegoating (Hermann, 2005, 
p. 202). Distrust of others shows whether or not the leader can rely on others. Even though distrust may 
be part of being a political leader, a leader with a low score for this trait can put this into perspective, 
contrary to a leader with a high score who is suspicious of others’ motives and actions (Hermann, 2005, 
p. 203). 
Hence, these traits provide information about the three dimensions;  1) a leaders’ belief that they can 
control events and their need for power determine how they will react to constraints; 2) conceptual 
complexity and self-confidence suggest their openness to information; 3) measuring their task-focus, 
distrust towards others and in-group bias will show the leader's motivation to act (Hermann, 2005, p. 
186). When these three dimensions are combined, they will result in eight leadership styles, as shown in 
table 1, namely: expansionistic, evangelistic, incremental, charismatic, directive, consultative, reactive or 
accommodative (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 96). When the leadership style is established, it gives some 
clues about the influence the leader has in the DMP.  
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Table 1  
Leadership style as a function of responsiveness to constraints, openness to information and motivation 
 
Responsiveness to 
constraints 
 
Openness to information 
Motivation 
 
Problem focus Relationship focus 
Challenges constraints 
(The leader becomes a 
crusader) 
Closed to information 
(The leader becomes a 
crusader) 
 
Expansionistic 
(Focus is on expanding 
one’s power and 
influence) 
Evangelistic 
(Focus is on persuading 
others to accept one’s 
message and join one’s 
cause) 
Challenges constraints 
(The leader is generally 
strategic) 
Open to information 
(The leader is generally 
strategic) 
Incremental 
(Focus is on maintaining 
one’s manoeuvrability 
and flexibility while 
avoiding the obstacles 
that continually try to 
limit both) 
Charismatic 
(Focus is on achieving 
one’s agenda by engaging 
others in the process and 
persuading them to act) 
Respects constraints 
(The leader is inclined 
toward pragmatism) 
Closed to information 
(The leader is inclined 
toward pragmatism) 
Directive 
(Focus is on personally 
guiding policy along paths 
consistent with one’s own 
views while still working 
within the norms and 
rules of one’s current 
position) 
Consultative 
(Focus is on monitoring 
that important others will 
support or not actively 
oppose, what one wants to 
do in a particular situation) 
Respects constraints 
(The leader is usually 
opportunistic) 
Open to information 
(The leader is usually 
opportunistic) 
Reactive 
(Focus is on assessing 
what is possible in the 
current situation given 
the nature of the problem 
and considering what 
important constituencies 
will allow) 
 
Accommodative 
(Focus is on reconciling 
differences and building 
consensus, empowering 
others and sharing 
accountability in the 
process) 
Note. Adapted from “Who leads matters: The effects of powerful individuals”, by Hermann et al., 2001, 
International Studies Review, 3(2), p. 95. 
 
Responsiveness to constraints shows how the leader reacts to constraints posed by the environment. 
The leader can either challenge them or respect them. Leaders who belong to the former group are 
usually goal-driven, their own beliefs are seen in the decisions made, they want to be able to control the 
situation and constraints are only seen as obstacles to overcome (Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 90-91). The 
latter group, on the other hand, sees constraints as their boundaries; the leader is sensitive to his or her 
surroundings, needs support from relevant constituencies, deals with situations on a case-by-case basis 
and is, therefore, flexible (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 91).  
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Openness to information determines how leaders process and gather information. On the one hand, 
there are goal-driven leaders with an agenda, they are less sensitive to the context, tend to seek 
information which affirm their own views and beliefs and look for advisers who share the same ideas 
(Hermann et al., 2001, p. 92). These leaders make choices relying on methods they are used to and 
search for information to strengthen the argument they had from the beginning (Hermann et al., 2001, 
p. 92). On the other hand, there are leaders who are more sensitive to the political context and are open 
to new information even though it may be different from their own point of view. These leaders take 
their time before making a decision and instead of gathering data top-down, they process data bottom-
up, allowing evidence from their surroundings to guide them (Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 92-93).  
Motivation for action indicates whether the leader is motivated by certain issues they would like to solve 
or by people they would like to please. Leaders who are motivated by problems are concerned with 
their own ideas and beliefs, making them less sensitive to the situation and focused on certain tasks. 
Leaders motivated by relationships, such as endorsement from important constituencies, make them 
more sensitive to the political context (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 93).   
If the leader is a constraints challenger, not open to information and either motivated by problem 
solving or by relationships, the style of the former is expansionistic, the latter is evangelistic. Both can be 
called crusaders as they are the least sensitive to political contexts, take charge and try to control what 
happens in the DMP. In contrast are the opportunists, the leaders who are most sensitive to political 
context and who would not take any chances if they risk losing support. Both reactive and 
accommodative styles respect constraints and are open to information, however, the former is 
motivated by problem solving and the latter by relationships (Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 95-96). The last 
group consists of leaders who display signs of being both high and low in their sensitivity to contexts. 
These strategic and pragmatic leaders are able to use the situation for their benefit, coming across as 
unpredictable because the strategists with incremental and charismatic leadership styles will carefully 
try to reach their goal without making any mistakes or failures, whilst the pragmatists, with directive and 
consultative leadership styles will try to reach their goal and work within the system (Hermann et al., 
2001, pp. 95-97).  
Based on Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis theoretical framework and previous research on 122 
leaders, including 87 heads of state from all over the world (2005, p. 188), I would expect that certain 
personality traits found in leaders that form their leadership style would determine the level of 
influence the leader will have in the DMP. Specifically, the characteristics of goal-driven leaders who 
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believe they can control events and have a high need for power will influence the DMP as their 
behaviour and choices depend on their own beliefs, attitudes, passions and principles. In contrast, the 
personality and preferences of leaders from the other end of the spectrum who are more pragmatic and 
more sensitive to the political context do not matter as much as the situation, the foreign policy 
problem, the media, the public or the people surrounding the leaders (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 89). 
R2P and Realism 
Other theories I would like to test and contrast to the LTA and leadership style framework are based on 
IR theories. Firstly, the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P). Stemming from the ‘Liberal peace’ (Glover, 
2011), R2P has become an important principle in the international community as the way to respond to 
crises that involve genocide and mass atrocities (Bellamy, 2012, p. 12). The R2P doctrine is the result of 
two fundamental principles in international politics; state sovereignty and human security (Cooper & 
Kohler, 2009, p. 3) and was unanimously adopted by world leaders at the United Nations World Summit 
in 2005 (Bellamy, 2012, p. 14). The three pillars supporting the concept are:  
(1) responsibility of the State to protect its populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement;  
(2) commitment of the international community to assist States in meeting those obligations;  
(3) responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State 
is manifestly failing to provide such protection6. 
The creation of R2P is based on the idea of states having a guideline based on international law to 
prevent genocides and mass atrocities such as the Cambodian genocide in the 1970s, the Rwandan 
genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995 (Evans, 2009, p. 15). According to the narrative of 
the states involved, the intervention was necessary due to R2P as there had been so many lives lost 
under the Gaddafi regime (Fermor, 2012, p. 335). The expectation based on this theory is that leaders 
make decisions because there is an international norm based on international law to which 
governments adhere to. 
Secondly, if realism was taken into account, with the assumptions that a state is a unitary actor and 
behaving based on self-interest as they strive to maximize power, then the expectation according to 
                                                          
6
 These are the main points from the documented three pillars, outlined by the UN Secretary General at the time, 
Ban Ki-Moon. From the UN document A/63/677 “Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the 
Secretary-General”, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/implementing%20the%20rtop.pdf  
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defensive realism would be that leaders make decisions because there is a national interest that can be 
obtained or protected by this particular action (Marsh, 2014, p. 122). The possible threats to US 
interests in Libya are lack of oil supply, terrorism or the flow of refugees caused by the crisis (Davidson, 
2013, p. 312).  
This brings us to the main hypothesis of the research. I expect that the personal characteristics of a goal-
driven leader, which falls under “crusaders” as they take charge of the DMP to make sure that they 
control what happens (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 96), will also have a big influence in the decision-making 
process during an international crisis besides the liberal’s explanation of states following international 
norm or the realist’s reasoning of protecting national interest.  
Methodology  
As Winter (2003) argues, the most effective way to study leaders from a distance is to use a content 
analysis of speeches and interviews as they provide a reflection of their psychological characteristics or 
personalities (p. 114). Hermann (2005) chose the same method in analysing leadership style using only 
interviews instead of speeches, as she believes the former is a more spontaneous setting and the 
leader’s personality will then be more evident (p. 179). A similar method of data collection will be used 
here as in Hermann’s trait analysis, by assessing more than 50 interviews with the leader’s responses in 
100 words or more and they will be chosen from different periods of the leader’s time in office, in 
different settings and different types of interviews to ensure that the traits composing leadership style 
being studied are stable over time (2005, pp. 180-181). This stability shows how sensitive the leader can 
be to the context (Hermann, 2005, p. 180). The assumption while using content analysis is that the more 
frequent the leader uses particular words, the more important these concepts are to them (Hermann, 
2005, p. 186).  
For these reasons, I employed the same method for the first half of my case study to determine 
Obama’s leadership style. I used the programme, Profiler Plus, and full transcripts of 32 interviews and 
33 press conferences (data available in the appendix). The interviews with Obama were done by 
different interviewers from several news agencies and television networks, and most of them were 
conducted in the White House. They were chosen from different years and different sources to prevent 
bias of certain news agencies. I have chosen four press conferences from each year of Obama’s time in 
office, in which he speaks alone (if he does not, then the parts in which other leaders speak are left out 
of the content analysis), and as spread out throughout the year as possible by using one conference 
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every quarter of the year to try and determine the consistency of his leadership style. To be able to do 
the latter, most of the conferences chosen are held in the White House, but at times materials are used 
when Obama was holding a conference outside the US.  
After applying this quantitative approach to identify Obama’s leadership style throughout his tenure, the 
outcome is used for a qualitative analysis using speeches and press conferences regarding Libya as proxy 
to the DMP, as I could not be there in person. This is to assess whether Obama’s personal characteristic, 
and in turn, his leadership style established with the LTA can be found in the DMP of the Libyan crisis 
and to see if it was the reason he made his choice to intervene. If this is the case, then I can ascertain 
that his personality influenced the process. Furthermore, articles and books on Obama, the White House 
and the time of the decision-making during the Libyan crisis were used to support the findings.  
Results and analysis 
Obama’s LTA and Leadership Style 
Table 2  
Obama’s personality in comparison with the average of 87 heads of state 
 
Individual characteristics 
 
87 Heads of state 
 
 
Obama 
Belief can control events 0.44 0.39 (average) 
Need for power  0.5 0.26 (low) 
Conceptual complexity  0.44 0.64 (high) 
Self-confidence 0.62 0.49 (average) 
Task-focus  0.59 0.61 (average) 
In-group bias  0.71 0.11 (low) 
Distrust of others 0.41 0.14 (low) 
Note. Data on 87 heads of state retrieved from Hermann (2005). 
Obama’s score for belief in one’s own ability to control events (0.39) is just under the mean in 
comparison to 87 other heads of state, but not more than one standard deviation below the mean. He 
is, therefore, moderate in this trait and is like the average leader in the comparison group. As 
established in the LTA framework, this indicates that Obama will not try to control everything in the 
decision-making process, but would not delegate everything either. He will also be open to compromise. 
Obama’s low score in need for power (0.26) points to the fact that it is important for him to empower 
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others around him instead of focusing on his own power. This creates a bond between them, based on 
trust and the feeling of shared responsibility. Obama has a sense of justice and treats everyone equally 
and does not play favourites. He represents the needs and interest of his followers in policy-making. The 
combination of these two traits shows that Obama can either challenge or respect constraints, 
depending on the context and according to Hermann this means that the leader will then be driven by 
the other traits (2005, p. 187). 
Obama’s moderate score in self-confidence (0.49) shows that he is not immune to incoming information 
from his surroundings, but he is not easily “buffeted by the ‘contextual winds’” either as Hermann 
describes leaders with moderate level of self-confidence (2005, p. 195). This is because Obama knows 
who he is without being too satisfied with himself. His high score in conceptual complexity (0.64) means 
that he sees that there are grey areas and having different perspectives are important in understanding 
the full picture. He does not rely on his intuition and he prefers thinking, planning and collecting more 
information over taking actions right away. Obama’s higher score on the conceptual complexity 
compared to his self-confidence implies that he is more sensitive to the political context and is open to 
ideas and demands of others. He will try to obtain as much information as possible from those around 
him to fully understand the situation and will act accordingly. He deals with situations on a case-by-case 
basis.  
Obama has a moderate score on task-focus (0.61), which means that he is motivated by both problem 
and relationship, depending on the context of the situation. This description fits that of a charismatic 
leader (Hermann, 2005, p. 198). He knows when to focus on the problem and he knows when to focus 
on building relationships. For the second type of motivation, Obama scores low in both in-group bias 
(0.11) and in distrust of others (0.14). His low score for in-group bias points to the fact that Obama does 
not see the world in black-and-white terms and when identifying people as either ‘us or them’  he looks 
at the context so the terms are fluid and change according to the situation. His low score of distrust in 
others means that he is likely to rely on others and does not have a zero-sum view of the world. The 
combination of the score of these two traits suggests that Obama’s focus is on taking advantage of 
opportunities and relationships. This shows again that he takes on problems and views them in their 
context, he knows that there are constraints and that is why he is flexible when dealing with an issue. 
Because he does not view the world as zero-sum, cooperation may be possible in certain international 
arenas. 
When everything is taken into account, there is a mixed expectation about what type of leadership style 
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Barack Obama has because of his moderate score on some of the traits. He is certainly open to 
information and is relatively sensitive to the political context, and according to the leadership style 
framework this means that his beliefs, attitudes, and passions are not highly predictive of his reaction to 
situations, however, he does need certain feedback from his surrounding when making a decision. 
Furthermore, Obama does not impose his ideas top-down but gathers information bottom-up and 
allows the evidence to guide him in making his decisions. He is moderate in whether he challenges or 
respects constraints. He is also moderate in his task-focus; depending on the situation he may focus on 
the problem or he may focus on his relations with the people around him. Thus, Obama falls under the 
style of the non-crusaders who are open to information. If he challenges constraints, then he is strategic 
and can either have the incremental or charismatic leadership style. And if he respects constraints then 
he is opportunistic and can have either the reactive leadership style or the accommodative one.  
If he is strategic, he falls under the more interesting leaders because “they can at the same time benefit 
from and use the situation in which they find themselves” (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 96). He then looks 
for information that will help him attain his goals but he does this with such caution as to minimize his 
risks. If he is incremental, then he wants to maintain control in foreign policy decision-making so that he 
would have the space to do what is necessary to achieve his goal. It does not matter if it takes him 
awhile before reaching that goal, as long as he is moving closer to it little by little. If he is charismatic, his 
focus is on relationships with important constituencies, also when making foreign policy decisions, as he 
needs their support because he knows that power and authority are given to him by those around him. 
In both strategic styles, the leader knows what he wants, but he also knows that it depends on the 
situation whether or not he can reach his goal. However, if he has an opportunistic style because his 
motivation towards the world leads to a focus on taking advantage of opportunities and relationships, 
then “politics is the art of the possible in the current setting and time” (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 96). If 
he has a reactive style, he lives in the moment and finds planning difficult as you cannot predict what 
will happen. He will do his best and use everything he has right then and there when dealing with 
problems, while staying rational and trying to reduce his risk as much as possible. The accommodative 
leader focuses on relationships, which causes consensus-building and results in compromises being 
important to them. The leader needs to know where the important constituencies stand on issues 
before he himself can make any decisions on those same issues (Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 99-100).  
As Obama has multiple traits in which his score was moderate, he does not fit exactly one ideal type of 
the leadership style and according to Hermann et al. this type of leader can move between styles (2001, 
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p. 100). Through analysing the DMP during his tenure, I will make an attempt to match one style that is 
closest to him and if this is not possible due to him being moderate in a couple of traits, I will assess the 
characteristics that are visible in the decision-making process. Based on LTA, I expect to see his 
openness to information, so when making a decision he is not too controlling and is open to 
compromise. He has good relations with those around him, he knows who he is and what he wants but 
he will take his time thinking and planning his next move, gathering as much information as possible 
along the process. His sensitivity to political context will be visible as he knows when to focus on the 
problem or the relationships; he does not see the world in black-and-white or in zero-sum terms. So, 
based on leadership style framework, his own views and beliefs would not be highly predictive of the 
choices he makes.  
Decision-making process in the Obama administration 
Since the Reagan administration, much of the policy development is centralized in to the White House. 
According to Robert Gates, Secretary of Defence under Obama, the Obama administration was the most 
centralized and controlling since Nixon and Kissinger were in office (Blohmdahl, 2016, p. 150). The policy 
making was generally done by White House staff as presidents cannot depend too much on cabinet 
secretaries having objective views on certain issues (Pfiffner, 2011, p. 245). The latter group tend to 
advocate for their own departments, while the president needs to consider different views and options 
before coming to important decisions (Pfiffner, 2011, p. 244). This was very important for Obama at the 
time.7 He took his time when major decisions were to be made and encouraged his staff to present as 
many opposing arguments as possible so that he would be able to see every option available (Pfiffner, 
2011; Hybel, 2014), just as predicted by the LTA outcome of his high conceptual complexity. Foley (2013) 
categorizes Obama as an introvert leader who values his space and privacy while considering his 
decisions (p. 349). After closely studying the working style of Obama and his inner circle in the White 
House, James Mann (2012) confirms in his book that the president would spend hours alone in the 
evening in the White House residence to ponder and come to a decision on his own without any 
interference from the outside world. If there were occasions where some of his staff were reluctant 
about presenting certain information, he would urge them to show him different options and even insist 
on them confronting their disagreements and sometimes each other, in front of him (Pfiffner, 2011, p. 
247), showing his openness to information.  
                                                          
7
 It becomes apparent in Pfiffner’s (2011) description of three different cases in which Obama showed his 
thoroughness in making decisions regarding detainee policy, economic policy and the Afghan war. 
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Obama did not have “honest brokers”, whose job is to make sure that every angle from the relevant 
staff is heard, like some presidents do, but he did choose to control the details of policy development 
himself, resulting in his comprehensive knowledge of the policy issues (Pfiffner, 2011, p. 244-248). He 
would not only focus on formulating the problem, he would sometimes even control the 
implementation of the foreign policy personally, making him more directly responsible for his choices 
than most previous presidents (Indyk, Lieberthal & O’Hanlon, 2012, p. 29). Mann (2012) also confirmed 
that Obama had a dominant influence in developing foreign policy and that he was the strategic mind 
behind the choices made in his administration. This is surprising as this action contradicts his low belief 
that he can control events and low need for power. Controlling foreign policy decision-making is, 
according to the framework, a trait of the incremental leadership style. His aides, the ‘Obamians’, whom 
he also relied heavily upon – which corresponds with his low distrust in others – were chosen because 
they share the same way of thinking, in a way forming an extension of the president (Mann, 2012). This 
contrasts with his openness to information, resembling more the trait of the goal-driven leaders, the 
ones with an agenda and who are less sensitive to the context, who surround themselves with advisers 
that think the same way. In Bob Woodward’s book ‘Obama’s Wars’8, there are concrete examples of 
how Obama kept control of his foreign policy. For example, General David Petraeus from the US Army 
was quoted pointing out how thorough Obama was when dealing with an important policy decision 
regarding Afghanistan, “there’s not a president in history that’s dictated ﬁve single-spaced pages in his 
life. That’s what the staff gets paid to do” (Woodward, 2010, p. 327), referring to the terms sheet to 
clarify the mission the army is supposed to carry out. Once Obama is done with considering every aspect 
there is, and evaluating dissenting views from his staff, he wanted consensus among his inner circle once 
he decided which option to take, “I welcome debate among my team, but I won’t tolerate division” 
(Woodward, 2010, p. 374).  
It is safe to say that Obama’s decision-making style is cautious and deliberative, always taking his time 
and trying to evaluate every possible angle because he considered the problems his personal 
responsibility as president (Foley, 2013, p. 349). This again correlates with his high conceptual 
complexity as he sees the importance of having different perspectives and thinking everything through 
before coming to a decision. He did almost the opposite of George W. Bush, and focused on a foreign 
policy agenda that showed restraint by slowly pulling out of Afghanistan and being more respectful 
                                                          
8
 Woodward also closely examined the activities in the White House, by using in-depth interviews with the White 
House aides and written record from National Security Council meeting notes, emails, reports, personal notes and 
many more documents that was not easily accessed by public. 
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towards the role of international institutions such as the United Nations and NATO (Onea, 2013, pp. 
149-151). Obama avoided taking risks, often assessed and reassessed his decisions and demanded much 
of his cognitive resources (Hybel, 2014, p. 173), showing a trait that is opposite of that of a goal-driven 
leader and again confirming his openness to information. Even  though his closest advisers were chosen 
because they think alike, he always encouraged them to come up with different, opposing views for him 
to evaluate, and his thoroughness and carefulness were also visible, making his leadership style more 
likely to be that of an opportunist because of his sensitivity to context and his openness to information, 
as shown in Table 1.  
Decision-making process of the Libyan intervention   
When analysing Obama’s speeches, remarks and news conferences regarding Libya9, a couple of things 
become apparent. At the beginning of the crisis, he already used many terms that are linked to R2P and 
building up to the justification of an intervention, however, his traits were still visible. He would talk 
about the importance of having a full range of options on the table and examining them before making 
his decision10, showing his high trait of conceptual complexity and his openness to information. “I do 
take very seriously making sure that any decisions I make that involve U.S. military power are well 
thought through and are done in close consultation with … all relevant personnel. Any time I send the 
United States forces into a potentially hostile situation, there are risks involved and there are 
consequences. And it is my job as President to make sure that we have considered all those risks”11, 
showing his typical cautious and thorough decision-making style like a strategic leader with either an 
incremental or a charismatic leadership style. Obama also spoke about “the interest of the United 
States”12 when referring to imposing sanctions on Qadhafi and making him step down, but linked it with 
the interest of the Libyan people as well. A possible US interest based on realism is oil, however, Obama 
mentioned it only once in all ten sources when he talked about how unrest in the Middle East could 
result in a low supply of world oil, but that the US would be able to fill that gap.13 Another interest 
                                                          
9
 Words that could be categorized under his traits, R2P and US interests were counted in five news conferences 
and four different addresses to the public and one letter to Congress. There were 28 words that point to his 
personality, 82 times terms were used that are linked to R2P and only ten times that US interests were indicated. 
Data available in the appendix.  
10
 The President's News Conference with President Felipe de Jesus Calderon Hinojosa of Mexico on March 3, 2011 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=89712   
11
 The President’s News Conference on March 11, 2011 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90137  
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid. 
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according to defensive realism is the flow of refugees, which came up once, “America has an important 
strategic interest in preventing Qadhafi from overrunning those who oppose him. A massacre would 
have driven thousands of additional refugees across Libya's borders”14.  
A week later, in his remarks informing the American people about the situation in Libya, he would only 
use terms that are linked to R2P and almost none pointing to his own characteristic. Obama talked 
about Qadhafi who was “launching a military campaign against his own people”15 and that there is a 
“humanitarian crisis”16, he would repeat sentences such as “protecting innocent civilians”17 and talking 
explicitly about R2P, “we are acting as part of a coalition … prepared to meet their responsibility to 
protect the people of Libya and uphold the mandate of the international community”18. In the same two 
addresses, the only things that can be identified as his personal characteristics are where he mentions 
the use of force not being his first choice and a difficult one for him to make, but that he still made it 
with confidence19, combining traits such as his moderate self-confidence with high conceptual 
complexity. Even though he had made up his mind in the beginning to not intervene, as soon as the 
evidence guided him to make a different choice he did not ignore it but instead examined all the options 
and with confidence chose a new policy. This is supported by the so-called Obama watchers (e.g. Mann, 
2012; Klein, 2013), as they could fill in the gap in the week of Obama’s changing his stance.  
Indeed, when the Arab Spring started, his first instinct was not to interfere, because the movement was 
something that belonged to the region and the US already had a lot on its plate with two wars going on 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, Obama did not want to start another war in another Islamic 
nation, especially not to topple a dictatorship as Bush did in Iraq (Mann, 2012; Klein, 2013). He handled 
the Libyan crisis the same way he handled most decision-making processes as described above. He was 
highly involved, led most meetings himself asking sharp questions, urging different voices to come up 
with arguments, but never in those occasions letting anybody know his decision (Mann, 2012; 
Blohmdahl, 2016). At that point, the Obama administration was divided (Klein, 2013, p. 216). One side 
held the realist view that there are no national interests in Libya (Fitzgerald & Ryan, 2014, p. 98) and so 
                                                          
14
 Address to the Nation on the Situation in Libya, March 28, 2011 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90195&st=&st1= 
15
 Remarks on the situation in Libya, March 18, 2011 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90162&st=&st1= 
16
 Ibid.  
17
 Remarks on the situation in Libya from Brasilia, March 19, 2011 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90164&st=&st1= 
18
 Ibid.  
19
 Ibid.  
20 
 
agreed with the president’s initial idea to not intervene. The other side consisted of proponents of 
humanitarian interventions. Both sides could not seem to prevail outright in convincing the president 
during the DMP, creating a stalemate and leaving the task for the president to make the final decision, 
which he did (Blohmdahl, 2016, p. 153).  
In the first half of March 2011, most of Obama’s responses were cautious but it gradually evolved into 
urging Qadhafi to step down and warning him that the option of using force was not excluded (Mann, 
2012). A couple of developments then took place that would change his mind (Mann, 2012; Klein, 2013). 
The British and the French were insisting that the US participate, reminding Obama of their NATO 
assistance in Afghanistan. There were more people in the senate who favoured a no-fly zone over Libya 
to tear down Gaddafi’s air defences, even the Arab League was on board and asked the UN Security 
Council for help. Finally, when Qadhafi’s forces were closing in on Benghazi, a city with more than half a 
million-people living in it without any defence, seemed to push Obama to finally act. On March 15th, he 
authorized not only a no-fly zone, but the air forces were allowed to hit targets on the ground (Mann, 
2012), starting his first war. With this decision, Obama turned from his characteristic realist stance in his 
foreign policy and embraced liberal interventionism (Fitzgerald & Ryan, 2012, p. 102). He used both as 
reasoning towards the public. Additionally, in his letter to congress, the only reasoning visible were R2P, 
“Qadhafi has forfeited his responsibility to protect his own citizens and created a serious need for 
immediate humanitarian assistance and protection, with any delay only putting more civilians at risk”20 
and US interest when explaining his choice for attacking Qadhafi’s military capabilities, “I have directed 
these actions, which are in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States”. From 
then on, the only terms that show his traits are related to the choice he already made to intervene, how 
he had directed the plan in great detail21 and kept evaluating the situation on the ground.22 Only a 
reactive leadership style could be detected then as he still mentioned his carefulness due to the risks 
involved and his rational reasoning, “I absolutely believe that the costs are outweighed by the benefits, 
and that is what drove my decision. And that's why I think that we need to make sure that we see this 
through effectively”.23 Until his last address to the American people, R2P had been dominant in his 
justification for the intervention.  
                                                          
20
 Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Commencement of Military Operations Against Libya, March 
21, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90174&st=&st1=  
21
 The President's News Conference With President Sebastian Pinera Echenique of Chile in Santiago, Chile 
March 21, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90190  
22
 Ibid. 
23
 The President's News Conference With President Carlos Mauricio Funes Cartagena of El Salvador in San Salvador, 
El Salvador, March 22, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90188 
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Looking back in a 2016 interview with the Atlantic magazine24, Obama admits that Benghazi was indeed 
the reason why he changed his mind and joined the side of the interventionists. Even though he may 
have been influenced by his advisors and finally chose one of the two sides, it was evident that he was 
the “supreme player” and not just one of the actors involved in the governmental bureaucracy but he 
was the one that created his own surrounding (Blohmdahl, 2016, p. 156). Also, Obama explains that if 
the situation were different, maybe if there had not been three ongoing wars for his administration, or if 
there would have been more international pressure and readiness, he would have taken similar 
measures for Syria as he did Libya.25 However, “a president does not make decisions in a vacuum. He 
does not have a blank slate. Any president who was thoughtful, I believe, would recognize that after 
over a decade of war, with obligations that are still to this day requiring great amounts of resources and 
attention in Afghanistan, with the experience of Iraq, with the strains that it’s placed on our military—
any thoughtful president would hesitate about making a renewed commitment in the exact same region 
of the world with some of the exact same dynamics and the same probability of an unsatisfactory 
outcome”.26 Again, confirming his most notable trait, high sensitivity to context which was established in 
the trait analysis. It is apparent in the DMP throughout his tenure, but also Libya, that he was open to 
information and always tried to obtain more by urging his staff to show him all the options. His context 
sensitivity also determined the effects of his other traits, whether he focused on the problems or 
relationships or whether he challenged constraints or respected them. His focus on relationships, 
however, was less apparent in the empirical evidence. He relied on his inner circle, but not so much on 
important constituencies. Moreover, what is remarkable is how the LTA shows his low need for power, 
but empirically it was the exact opposite. Obama tried to control most aspects of the DMP like a 
crusader, sometimes even writing his own policy options and wanting to control the implementation, 
overseeing the whole process from the ideas in his mind until he sees them in action. For a non-goal-
driven leader the leadership style matching him the most is the incremental leadership style, but his 
rationality and cautiousness while making decisions point to the reactive leadership style. This reduces 
his motivation for action to only a focus on problems and not relationships, leaving only his attitude 
towards constraints to depend on the context.  
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 https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/  
25
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
Though it is not possible to look behind the scenes, it is seen in the output, in the decisions made about 
Libya, that Obama acts according to the LTA outcome. He was so convinced of his position at the 
beginning, but when a series of developments took place, he was once again open to new information. 
He adjusted his mind-set and acted accordingly. Initially, the characteristics of a goal-driven leader 
appear to have the most influence in the DMP because they are relatively closed to outside information 
and they challenge constraints, so they are not flexible, do not adjust to contexts but only strive towards 
their goal. Their characteristics lead to decisions based on who the leaders are. If Obama had been a 
goal-driven leader, he might have stayed with his first decision not to intervene, or he might have gone 
completely the opposite direction and would have wanted to intervene in the first place, not listen to 
any advice and sent troops right away. Hence, different leaders’ characteristics, and in turn their 
leadership style, influence the decision-making process differently.  
Even though Obama was not a goal-driven leader according to the LTA framework because of his 
sensitivity to the context and the ability to adjust himself to the situation, he still controlled most of the 
decision-making process during his tenure as described in the analysis. In his decision of Libya, however, 
he did not seem as controlling; showing his traits that correspond with the LTA outcome, and it would 
appear that R2P influenced his choice more than his characteristic did. Nonetheless, his flexible 
character, how he processes and handle information can be the reason why he acknowledged and chose 
R2P as his final decision. This shows, even though he was not the typical goal-driven leader, his 
characteristic did influence the DMP.  
Admittedly, it is not the goal of this thesis to prove that the characteristics and leadership style are the 
most important factors in the decision-making process, but it is of importance and gives a more 
complete explanation of why certain decisions are made in an international crisis. The explanations of 
R2P and realism in foreign policy might have been important for Obama’s staff in developing their 
arguments and consequently have been important for Obama to come to a decision, but ultimately his 
characteristics affect how he processes information, deals with constraints and his motivation for action 
and thus his final decision. The question is now, if there had been another leader in power with different 
characteristics, had (s)he made a different decision? As this thesis is limited, the question could be a 
recommendation for future research.  
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Appendix 
List of interviews including LTA outcomes.  
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DIS: distrust in others, TASK: task-focus, BACE: belief can control events, IGB: in-group bias, SC: self-
confidence, CC: conceptual complexity, PWR: need for power 
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List  of conferences including LTA outcomes. 
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List of terms used to describe R2P  
Terms and expressions Amount of times used in speeches and remarks 
Attacks/violence/assaults/murders/massacres 
against/of citizens/civilians/Libyan people 
 
15 
Protection of the Libyan people 18 
 
Qadhafi’s attacks/atrocities on his own people 11 
 
assaults on innocent/defenceless men and women 
by own government  
5 
humanitarian threat/catastrophe/crisis 
 
5 
humanitarian 
aid/assistance/efforts/goals/interests 
 
9 
 
urgent humanitarian needs/needs of the Libyan 
people 
1 
illegitimate use of force  
 
2 
Qadhafi has lost his legitimacy to rule 
 
1 
potential atrocities inside of Libya 
 
3 
prevent a humanitarian catastrophe 
 
3 
to take all necessary measures to protect civilians 
 
2 
Support the aspirations of the Libyan people (for 
freedom, democracy and dignity)  
2 
Mentions of failure of the international 
community in their obligation/responsibility 
towards Rwanda and the Balkans 
2 
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List of terms used to describe Obama’s personality  
Terms and expressions Amount of times used in speeches and remarks 
examine a full range of options 7 
 
in consultation with 
 
5 
minimizing harm to innocent civilians 
 
3 
Do not take decisions lightly 
 
1 
Judgment calls 
 
1 
monitoring the situation and matching our actions 
 
1 
the plan developed in great detail extensively 
 
1 
continuation of evaluation of the situation  
 
1 
Talking about risks involved 
 
2 
costs outweighing benefits and that is what drove 
my decision and why we need to see it through 
effectively 
1 
 
patience in achieving goal 
 
1 
the use of force is not our first choice and not a 
choice that I make lightly 
 
1 
 
List of terms used to describe US interests  
Terms and expressions Amount of times used in speeches and remarks 
it serves US interests well 
 
1 
in the interest of the US 
 
3 
Libya provides a type of oil that is highly valued 
 
1 
very practical/strategic interest 
 
2 
the national security and foreign policy interests 
of the US 
1 
Nobody has a bigger stake…than does the United 
States of America 
1 
Huge national interest 
 
1 
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